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But it is essential that there be a contract to transfer the stock,
and it must not be unconscionable, tainted with fraud, or against
public policy, else specific performance'will be refused. So also
will it be refused if the contract to transfer is conditional, and
the condition or contract upon which it depends has not been performed. And the opinion is ventured that while contracts to convey shares in private companies are commonly specifically enforced
in equity, yet, if a case should arise wherein the stock, although
private, was readily purchasable at well-known prices, by reason of
which damages at law would constitute an adequate remedy, then
equity should refuse specific enforcement of a contract to transfer
such shares.
ADELBERT HAMILTON.

Chicago.
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THE SINGER MANUFACTURING CO. v. LOOG.
A trader has a right to make and sell machines similar in form and construction
to those made and sold by a rival trader, and in describing and advertising his own
machines, to refer to his rival's machines and his rival's name, provided he does
this in such a way as to obviate any reasonable possibility of misunderstanding or
deception.

from a decision of the Court of Appeal, reported Law
Rep., 18 Oh. Div. 395. The facts are sufficiently stated in the
opinion.
APPEAL

Aston, Q. 0., and Benjamin, Q. 0. (Rigbyi, Q. C., and B.
Coleridge, with them), for appellants.
Webster, Q. 0., -Everitt, Q. C., and Abrahams, for respondents.
Lord SELBORNE, L. C.-The plaintiffs (appellants here) are the
same American company who were appellants in the case of " The
Singer Aanufacturing Co. v. Wilson," decided by this House in
1877. They are the successors in business of an Ameripan manufacturer of, and dealer in, sewing machines, named Singer. Mr.
Singer was not originally the inventor or patentee of any machines,
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but he held a license to manufacture and sell them from a patentee
named Howe. The plaintiffs succeeded to his business on their
first incorporation, in 1863, and they have since carried on a large
and successful trade, both in this country and in America. They
became proprietors of, or interested in, several patents (some
American, some English) for improvements, or supposed improvements, upon the machines manufactured and sold by them. All
these patents, however, had expired some time before the acts were
done which are complained of in this suit. The plaintiffs say that
the machines which they now make and sell, and have for a considerable time past made and sold, are not in any important respect
(except that most of them have what is called the "needle and
shuttle" action) identical with any sewing machines which were
ever patented ; and they have from time to time varied the form
and construction of their machines so that those which they make
now are different from those which they and Mr. Singer before
them, formerly made. They allege that the word "Singer," as
applied to sewing machines, is understood in the trade to signify
machines of their own manufacture (of which there are several
known varieties) and nothing else. They have used that name or
word on the brass plates or labels which they have affixed to all the.
machines sold by them. They admit that every body is at liberty
to make and sell machines exactly similar, both in form and in.
construction to their own, but they deny the right of any one to.
use the word "Singer" in any way whatever in connection with
machines not of their manufacture. The presentation was brought
by them for an injunction and damages against the defendant (the
agent in this country of a sewing machine manufacturing company
established at Berlin) on the ground, as alleged in the tenth
paragraph of the statement of claim, that by "representing sewing
machines sold or offered for sale by him, as Singer machines," he
had "endeavored to obtain, and succeeded in obtaining, for the
machines sold by him, some of the reputation attaching to the
plaintiff's manufacture, and had induced" (and unless restrained
would continue to induce) "purchasers of his machines to believe
that the machines sold by him were in fact machines of the plaintiffs' manufacture, or (in the case of purchasers whose attention had
not been called to the plaintiffs' firm) to believe that machines
sold by him were machines made by the manufacturers of the
machines by which the reputation of the name ' Singer' had been
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acquired." If the case so stated were established, there could be
no doubt of the plaintiffs' right to some relief, upon the ordinary
principles applicable to trade-marks and trade-names. To a certain extent the case was established and indeed was not contested
by the defendant. It was not in controversy that to some of the
machines manufactured by the Berlin company and sold by the
defendant (exactly similar in form, pattern and construction to some
of those manufactured and sold by the plaintiffs) a brass plate or
label, also similar in form, size and position to the brass plates or
labels engraved with the plaintiffs' trade-mark had been attached ;
on which brass plate or label the word "Singer" appeared, though
associated with other words, which if carefully read might inform
a customer that the machine was manufactured by the Berlin company. The defendant as representative in this country of the
Berlin company was a wholesale dealer only; and all persons who
bought direct from him knew that the machines which he sold were
of the Berlin company's manufacture, and not of the manufacture
of the plaintiffs. But the machines bearing those brass plates or
labels, though supplied by him to wholesale customers who could
not be themselves deceived, would be liable to pass from them by
retail into the hands of other persons, some perhaps ignorant and
unwary, who, seeing upon them a brass plate or label with the same
appearance as the plaintiffs, and also having the word "Singer"
upon it, might mistake that plate or label for the plaintiffs' trademark, and believe that those machines were really of the plaintiffs'
manufacture. The principles applicable to such a case are well
established, and have been several times recognised and illustrated
in your lordships' House; the most recent authority in this House
being Johnson v. Orr -Ewing, 7 App. Cas. 219. The imitation
of a man's trade-mark in a manner liable to mislead the unwary
cannot be justified by showing either that the device oi- inscription
upon the imitated mark is ambiguous and capable of being understood by different persons in different ways, or that a person who
carefully and intelligently examined and studied it might not be
misled. The plaintiffs have obtained an injunction to the full
extent necessary to protect their trade-mark. But the Vice-chanoellor by whom the action was tried went further and also prohibited
the defendant (in effect) from using the word "Singer" in any
way whatever, with respect to any machine not manufactured by
the plaintiffs' company. The lords-justices on appeal, thought when
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the trade-mark was out of the case nothing else was shdwn by the
evidence to have been done or intended, or likely to be done by
the defendant against which he ought to be enjoined. They therefore discharged that part of the Vice-chancellor's order which went
beyond the protection of the plaintiffs' trade-mark, and the question
upon the appeal is whether they were right in doing so. It is
necessary for this purpose to consider what the defendant (representing the Berlin company) has actually done, beyond the use
of the objectionable brass plate or label, which must be taken to
have now finally ceased, and what may be reasonably presumed,
from the nature of his business and course of dealing, to be the
intention or the probable effect of what he has done, or is likely
hereafter to do.
The plaintiffs take exception to the employment of the word
"Singer" in a certain manner, in four documents, of which the
defendant makes use for the purposes of the Berlin company's business. One of them is a broad sheet or advertisement, printed on
both sides, and headed on one side "The improved Wheeler-Wilson and Singer systems, manufactured by the Sewing Machine
Manufacturing Company,, late Frister & Rossmann, Berlin." In
this title, the words "Wheeler-Wilson," "Singer," and "Frister &
Rossmann," are all in large type, and all equally conspicuous. It
is divided into two equal parts by an engraving of the Berlin Company's manufactory, in the margin of which the addresses of their
agents in nine continental cities, besides London, are given. Below
these follows half a page of letter press in small type, in the course
of which the phrases "The Wheeler-Wilson," and "The Singer
System," several times occur: also, "Our Singer machines, pronounced on unquestionable authority to be superior to the so-called
original Singer machine:" also," Wheeler-Wilson's," and "Singer's"
in a context evidently referring to the "two systems ;" also a statement that "our Singer machines" are made in a way which causes
them to work without noise, "contrary to the very noisy Singer
machine of our competitors." On the other side of the broad sheet
fifteen different numbers of machines are figured, of which the first
are described as on the "Wheeler-Wilson" system, and the last five
as on the "Singer system," and in the middle of that side, to the
left, is a "list of attachments given with every Frister & Rossmann
machine, Singer system." The second document is a small pricelist, headed "The Sewing Machine Manufacturing Company, late
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Frister & Rossmann, limited, 128 London Wall, London, E. 0.
Price list. Private." It is divided into two parts, the first entitled
"1Wheeler and Wilson Improved System," the second, "Singer Improved System." That (except the prices attached) is all. Of the
third document, the title page is "Directions for the use of Frister
& Rossmann's shuttle sewing machine, on Singer's improved system," the word " Singer" being printed in large letters, but not
more conspicuously than "Frister and Rossmann's." The directions themselves, which extend over sixteen pages, do not contain
the word " Singer," but they are headed "Instructions for use of
the family shuttle-machine on the Singer system." The fourth and
last document was an invoice given to a witness, who purchased one
of defendant's machines, representing himself to be in the trade,
in which the article sold was described as "one Singer hand-machine,
No. 14." None of these documents (unless it be'the " directions
for use") were of a nature or character which, according to the
course of the defendant's business, could be intended, or would be
likely to come into the hands of any retail dealer to whom machines
sold by the defendant might afterwards be resold. The defendant's
business was, as has been stated, exclusively wholesale; he would not
circulate or deliver these documents or any of them to any person
"not in the trade." Two of them (the price list marked "private,"
and the invoice showing the wholesale prices of the machines sold)
were manifrstly not addressed to retail customers, nor likely, in the
ordinary course of the business of any persons who bought the defendant's machines, to be communicated to them. It was admitted
by the plaintiffs' witnesses, and to me it seems clear, that no purchaser of the class to whom alone ,these documents were issued by
the defendant could possibly be thereby deceived or misled into
supposing that the machines sold by the defendant were of the plaintiffs' mnufacture, or that the business carried on by the defendant
was the plaintiffs' business. All such purchasers must necessarily
have understood that the articles which they ordered or bought were
manufactured by the Berlin company, though some of them were
made upon a "system," which was called the "Singer system."
The invoice is the only document which, even if it had got into the
hands of a careless retail purchaser, might (in my opinion) have
beell reasonably capable of being otherwise understood. It is,
therefore, in my judgment, superfluous to enter into a close comparison between these documents, or any of them, and that Dublin
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price list of the defendants in the case of the Singer llanufaceturing Company, 3 App. Cas. 376, on which Lord CAIRNS, in
this House, made certain observations from which I in no way dissent. That was a price list, materially different in its form and
phraseology from any of these documents, which in the ordinary
course of Messrs. Wilson & Co.'s business (who were retail as well
as wholesale dealers) was liable to pass into the hands of ignorant
and unwary customers. The present documents (except the "directions") could not do so, without a deviation from the settled course
of the defendants, and from the natural and presumable course of
his customers' business. It was contended that the acts of the
defendant enabled his wholesale customers to show these documents
to their own retail customers, for the purpose of passing off the
goods bought from the defendant as the plaintiffs' manufacture.
The answer is that unless the documents were fabricated with a
view to such a fraudulent use of them, or unless they were in themselves of such a nature as to suggest, or readily and easily lend
themselves to, such a fraud (which in my opinion they were not)
the supposed consequence is too remote, speculative and improbable,
to be imputed to the defendant, or to be a ground for the interference of a court of justice with the course of the defendant's business. There is no evidence that, in point of fact, any such use was
ever made of them.
The directions for use," spoke unmistakably of" Frister &
Rossmann's shuttle sewing machine ;" and no one; however careless, could read, in that document, the words "on Singer's improved system," without seeing and understanding their context.
The question, therefore, is whether the defendant, not representing
the machines which he sells as of the manufacture of the plaintiffs,
but, on the contrary, representing them as manufactured by the
Berlin company, is at liberty to say that he makes them " on the
Singer system." I agree with the Court of Appeal in thinking
that he is at liberty to do so, and that by so doing (if,in substance,
he does no more) he infringes no right of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs have insisted, throughout the suit, that the words "the Singer
system" (so used) are misleading, arbitrary and unmeaning; that
there is no system or principle whatever, distinctive or characteristic of any class or classes of machine manufactured either by
themselves or by the Berlin company, to which that term can
rationally be applied ; and, therefore, that it can only be intended,
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and can only have a tendency, to deceive. I will assume, without
deciding) that if it were so this might be some evidence of an intention on the part of the defendant and his company, and those dealing with them, to pass into the general market goods manufactured
by the Berlin company under the denomination of" Singer machines," in order that they might obtain the benefit of the plaintiffs'
reputation, and be supposed (more or less extensively) to be of the
plaintiffs' manufacture. But on this point, the contention of the
plaintiffs appears to me to be disproved by the evidence. I am satisfied that the phrase "Singer system," whether scientific or not,
whether exact or loose, is used by the defendant and by other
persons in the same trade, to signify not a figment but a fact. The
defendant, as agent of the Berlin company, deals in two only of the
several varieties of machines which the plaintiffs also make, viz.,
those styled the "Family" and the "Medi d m" machines; the
"Medium" scarcely, if at all, differing from the "Family," except
in size. He also, it must be recollected, deals in other machines,
at least as prominently put forward in his advertisement sheets and
price lists, which he describes as manufactured on the " WheelerWilson system." There are, in fact, a good many different kinds
of sewing machines, well known to the trade, which have come to be
described by appellations derived from the names of their original
inventors, patentees or manufacturers, of which appellations
"Wheeler-Wilson" is one. Messrs. Wheeler and Wilson (like Mr.
Singer) formed a company for the manufacture of sewing machines;
and that company, like the plaintiffs in the present case, sought to
restrain the use of the name "Wheeler-Wilson" by other manufacturers. It was decided, however, by Vice-chancellor JAmEs, in
1869 (39 L. J. (N. S.) Chan. p. 36), that this name, "WheelerWilson," had come to signify in the trade, not the particular manufacture of Messrs. Wheeler & Wilson, or of the Wheeler-Wilson
Company, but the kind or kinds of machines which they made, the
manufacture of which was publiei juris. The injunction therefore
asked in that case was refused.- Your lordships have not now to
review that decision, nor do I assume that it was or that it was not
right; but it is part of the history of the trade in those sewing
machines in which the present defendant now deals, and it is manifest, on the face of the defendant's advertisement sheets and price
list, that he has used the words "Singer system" in exactly the
same sense relatively to the plaintiffs and their predecessors in bus-
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iness, in which he uses the words "Wheeler-Wilson system" relatively to Messrs. Wheeler & Wilson's and the company carrying on
business under that name.
The defendant's witness, Mr. Newton Wilson, says: "Every sewing machine, as it came into the English market, successively, from
America, came to be known in the first place by its outward form,
and secondly by the arrangement of parts which constitute that
machine, and that arrangement of parts, combined with that peculiar outward form, constitutes a type or class." This is evidently
what the defendant and others in the trade who used the same phraIn the
seology -with the defendant mean by the word "system."
defendant
avers
defence
the
ninth paragraph of his statement of
that the words "Singer system," and "Singer machines," as he
uses them, are, and are understood in the trade to be descriptive of
certain special chaiacteristics of outward form and internal construction which he there specifies; and this statement is supported
(with only, as it seems to me, verbal and immaterial variations) by
the evidence of a scientific witness for the defendant, Mr. Imray.
That witness divides sewing machines into three principal classes.
1. The lock stitch, working with a needle and shuttle. 2. The
chain stitch. 3. The double chain stitch. To the first or "lock
stitch" type of machines he says, all those known under the appellations "Howe," "Thomas," "Singer," and -' Wheeler & Wilson"
belong, and he specifies the distinctive characters of each kind and
(among them) in much detail, those of the machines known (accordThe names, he says,
ing to him) under the name of "Singer."
/' always convey to my mind a distinctive idea of a distinct thing,"
that is of "great similarity ;" "there might be varieties in detail,
and yet the broad construction and form might be the same." I
believe this evidence. It is in substance confirmed by facts admitted in cross-examination by the plaintiffs' own manager Mr.
Woodruffe, and also by a considerable body of documentary evidence, some of which proceeds from sources independent of the
parties to the present litigation, and some is traceable to the plaintiffs themselves. Among the defendant's exhibits were circulars of
two German houses (unconnected, so far as appears, with the Berlin
company) carrying on business respectively at Frankfort and Hamburg, in which sewing machines, made or sold by them, are classified under the general appellations of "system Wheeler & Wilson,"
"system Singer," "system Grover & Baker," "system Howe,"
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and " system Wilcox & Gibbs," showing that these are known denominations of particular kinds of machines upon the continent of
Europe. It may be (as was said by the plaintiffs' counsel) that all
these were issued after 1870, the time to which the plaintiffs refer
the commencement in this country of that use of the name "Singer," by other manufacturers, which they allege to be unlawful.
No such explanation, however, can be given of the circulars of
M. Callebaut, a French manufacturer, who, in 1865, obtained a
gold medal, at the Paris Exhibition, for a machine or machines of
the plaintiffs' own manufacture, for which medal the plaintiffs, in
their own circulars, claimed credit, and to whom the plaintiffs by
agreemenf relinquished the exclusive right of manufacturing that
class of machines in France. In this circular, of M. Callebaut published, certainly before 1870, the words "syst~me Singer" are used
to describe the machines of his own French manufacture. Nay
more, the plaintiffs themselves, in the same circulars in which they
reckoned M. Callebaut's gold medal among the premiums obtained
by them at various industrial and international exhibitions, said:
" The principle of the Singer Manufacturing Company's sewing
machines has never been changed since their first introduction to
the public; yet many beautiful labor-saving additions have been
attached," &c., and they described their family machine as "constructed on sound mechanical principles which have been thoroughly
tested with a view to obtain the greatest possible degree of simplicity
and durability without liability to derangement," and as sewing
"with a straight needle, thus obtaining the greatest possible amount
of strength and power to pass seams and irregularities in the work,
which manifestly can never be equalled by any system using a
curved needle." (The italics are in the circular.) This language,
the plaintiffs' manager, Mr. Woodruffe, tried, in his cross-examination, to explain away by saying that it" had no meaning," and was
"very stupid" and "deceived people," and that the plaintiffs were
"capable of doing stupid things as well as other people." It is
superfluous to say that the fact appears to me of much more value
than the explanation. There were also expressions of an import
which, in my opinion, amounts to much the same thing in the specifications of several patents taken out in this country by the plaintiffs or their agdnts for improvements in their machines.
In Newton's specification of 1863 (the invention patented being
a communication, from Mr. Singer), mention is made of "1an ordi-
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nary Singer machine fitted with a novel arrangement," and of
"Singer's well known construction of sewing machines."
In Woodruffe's specification of 1865, "the means shown for
operating the needle and shuttle" are said to "require no special
explanation" because it is " the well known arrangement of Singer
machines." I think it unnecessary to pursue this point further.
It may be true, as the plaintiffs say, that the machines to which
they now attach that appellation vary in points, which may possibly
be useful and important, from their older machines by which it was
originally acquired; but the conclusion to which I am brought
unhesitatingly by the whole evidence is, that there has been, for
many years past, sufficient continuity and identity of method in the
construction of the plaintiffs' lock-stitch machines (particularly of
machines of those classes which they describe as "Family" or
and which are also manufactured by the Berlin com"fMedium,"
pany) to make the term " Singer system," as used with respect to
these machines, a bona fide and intelligible description, which has
obtained extensive currency both in England and on the continent
of Europe, of some really distinctive character or characters in that
method of construction. It follows that in my opinion the use of
that phraseology by the defendant is not evidence of any fraudulent
purpose or intent. It was urged, however, that it ought not to be
regarded separately from the use of the brass plate or label which
has been adjudged to be an infringement of the plaintiffs' trademark, and that it is one of a series of acts designed with a view to,
and practically terminating in, the use of the plate or label; and
that all such acts being so connected together ought to be alike prohibited. In this view I cannot agree. I think that the representations made by the defendant to his wholesale customers, whether
orally or by broad sheet, price list, or invoice have no natural or
necessary connection in intention or in fact with any deception of
retail customers which might possibly arise from the use of the
brass plate or label. No one could contend that there was any such
connection if, in these representations to the defendant's wholesale
customers, the word " Singer" had not occurred; and the case is
really the same if (as I think) the word " Singer" was so used as
to obviate any reasonable possibility of misunderstanding or deception. The counsel for the appellant lastly argued that the plaintiffs, trading under Mr. Singer's name, and using his trade-mark,
had acquired such a right of property in that name as to entitle
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them to restrain any rival in trade from introducing it into any of his
price lists, circulars or advertisements, even in such a way as might
exclude the possibility of its being understood to represent, directly
or indirectly, that the goods sold by "him were manufactured by the
plaintiffs, or that his trade or business was identified or connected
with the trade or business of the plaintiffs. For that argument no
authority was cited; and it cannot, in my opinion, be maintained
upon any principle. The reputation acquired by machines of a
particular form or construction is one thing; the reputation of the
plaintiffs as manufacturers is another. If the defendant has no
right, under color of the former, to invade the latter, neither have
the plaintiffs any right under color of the latter to claim (in effect)
a monopoly of the former. If the defendant has (and it is not
denied that he has) a right to make and sell in competition with the
plaintiffs,' articles exactly similar in form and construction to those
made and sold by the plaintiffs, he must also have a right to say
that he does so, and to employ for that purpose, the terminology
common in their trade, provided always that he does this in a fair,
distinct and unequivocal way.
The Court of Appeal has thought that (apart fr6m the infringement of the trade-mark) this is all that he has done. I think
the same, and I therefore move your lordships to dismiss this
appeal.
BLACKBURN, WATSoN

and

B3RAMWELL,

L.JJ., delivered concur-

ring opinions.
- The Singer Manufacturing Co. v. Wilson, decided by the House of Lords in
1877 (L. R., 3 App. Cas. 376), and referred to by Lord Chancellor SELBORUNE
in his very elaboratejudgment in the principal case, decided that S. having made a
sewing machine which became known by
his own name which he gave to it, and
having afterwards' taken other persons
into partnership with him for the sale
of such machines, which machines were
made in great variety, and with many
modifications, but though not protected
by patents were established in public
favor under the name of the "CS."
sewing machines; and W., having sold
sewing machines and advertised among

others " S." sewing machines, but used
his own trade-mark on the machines,
and expressly stated in his advertisements that the machines sold by him
were manufactured by himself- this
nevertheless constituted a wrongful
invasion of the property of S., and
W. might be restrained by injunction,
fraud not being necessary to be averred
or proved in order to obtain protection
for a trade-mark.
The next case cited by Lord SnLBOnxn was that of Johnston v. Orr
Ewing, 7 App. Cas. 219. The principles
there enunciated are, as stated by the
Lord-Chancellor, that " the imitation of
a man's trade-mark in a manner liable to
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mislead the unwary cannot be justified by
shoving either that the device or inscription upon the imitated mark is ambiguous
and capable of being understood by different persons in different ways,or that a person who carefully and intelligently examined and studied itmightnotbemisled."'
But that was not the question before the
House of Lords in Singer Manufacturing
Co. v. Loog, for 11the plaintiffs," in that
case, "had obtained an injunction to the
full extent necessary to protect their
trade-mark ; but the Vice-Chancellor, by
whom the action was tried, went further, and also prohibited the defendant
(in effect) from using the word "Singer" in any way whatever with respect
to any machine not manufactured by the
plaintiffs' company. The lords justices
discharged that part of the order, and the
question before the House of Lords was,
were they right in so doing ? We may,
therefore, eliminate the question of infringement of the trade-mark from our
consideration. The exception taken by
the plaintiffs was to the employment of
"
the word " Singer in a certain manner.
The Lord Chancellor then referred to
the case of The Wheeler- Wilson Manufacturing Co. v. Shakespear, 39 L. J.
(Ch.) 36, in which it was decided that
"where articles of a particular kind
have become known in commerce under
the name of the original manufacturer
or patentee, as the case may be, anyper'on has a right, after the expiration of
the patent, to manufacture such articles
and sell them under that name; but he
may not, by inserting the name, as a
proper name, on his shop front or otherwise, lead the public to believe that he is
selling as the agent for the original manufacturer."
In Singer v. Wilson, Lord Br.AOsnmun

queried whether there is property in a
name, and whether it is necessary to
prove, fraud in the person who without
warrant adopts it.
Lord GonmoN entertained "1no doubt
that different principles of law might be

applicable to a trade-name from those
applicable to a trade-mark."
The House held that at all events in
the case of a trade-mark it is not necessary either to aver or prove fraud in
order to obtain protection for it. But a
trade-name appears to be based upon a
somewhat different principle, and it is
the fraudulent use of it that 'constitutes
the injury, and the mere adoption of it,
as a word of terminology common in the
trade, if done "in a fair, distinct and
unequivocal way," will not entitle the
representative of an original trade-name
to claim a monopoly. The reputation of
the machines is one thing, the reputation
of the manufacturers is another. If one
manufacturer has a right to make and
sell, in competition, a particular character
of machine exactly similar to those sold
by another manufacturer, he must also
have a right to describe them by the
name by which they are known in the
trade, always assuming that such name
has become descriptive, and is used not as
a figment but a fact-that fact being that
the original name of the inventor, for instance, had come to signify in the trade,
not the particular manufacture of the
original individual or his successors, but
the kind or kinds of machines which they
made, the manufacture of which was open
to public competition. The whole question resolves itself into a matter of bona
ftdes. Does the assumption of the original name of an inventor with the word
"system" prefixed or appended by another manufacturer convey an intelligible description which has obtained
currency far and wide of some really
distinctive character in the method of
construction ?
Of course, if under cover of such a
description an innuendo is conveyed that
a competitor is the agent of the original
manufacturer there at once arises the
question of fraud, expressed or implied,
but no such ingredient entered into the
principal case, since the defendant had
been restrained by injunction in the
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court below from using a brass plate
similar in appearance to the brass plates
engraved with plaintiff's trade-mark,
and the only question in the House of
Lords was as to the validity of that part
of the Vice-Chancellor's order which
went beyond the injunction against the
infringement of the trade-mark.
The case of Howard v. Park, 2 Am.
Law Reg., (N. S.) 644, appears somewhat at conflict with this more recent
decision of the House of Lords.
In
the American case the Supreme Court
of New York decided that the tradename of a firm is property, and no
other person, without the firm's consent, and not having the same name, can
use it in trade to the disadvantage or
injury of such firm, and that such name
may be assigned to a successor firm,
which thereby obtains the same rights in
said name as its predecessor had. And
further that a dealer in a commodity identical in manufacture and character with
that dealt in by such firm and its successor, would be enjoined from the sale of
such commodity in a wrapper countersigned with such trade-name without authority, even though the dealer purchased the commodity from the original
manufacturers, who were authorized to
affix the trade-name to such of their
products as were designed for such
firm. In the note to that case reference is made to the decision of the Court
of Appeal in the. principal case, and
also to the case of Singer Manufacturing
Co. v. Wilson. Upon a careful perusal
and comparison it will be seen that there
is no inconsistency in the decisions.
The decree in Singer v. Wilson was
reversed without prejudice to any question in the case; and the case was remitted to the Chancery division with liberty to the defendant to make again
application for leave to adduce vria voes
evidence in reply to the plaintiffs.
The Lord Chancellor (Lord CAinxs)
said: "In the present case the question
must, as it seems to me, be : Are the
VOL. XXX.-66

advertisements of the defendant, having
regard to the evidence in the case, calculated to mislead an unwary purchaser of
the machines ?"
With respect to a trade-name Mr. Upton observes that "A trade-mark consists
of a right of property in a mere name,
figure, letter-mark, device or symbol,
when used as a designation of a thing :''
Upton's Treatise on the Law of Trademarks, pp. 14, 15. Yet a mere tradename cannot be registered as a trade-mark
under the Act of Congress of 1881, the
words of sect. 3 of that act being very
specific-" No alleged trade-mark which
is merely the name of the applicant shall
be registered."
The decision in the
principal case did not, however, turn
at all upon the question of the infringement of a trade-mark, as we have already
seen, but both it and that in Singer v.
Wilson, rested upon the bona or mala
fides of the transaction. Indeed the
fundamental rule, said Lord IliGsnowxn, "is that no man has a right to
put off his goods as the goods of a rival
trader, and he cannot, therefore, in the
language of Lord LANGDALE, in the

case of Perry v. Truefitt, 6 Beav. 66, be
allowed to use names, marks or other
indicia, by which he may induce purchasers to believe that the goods which he is
selling are the manufacture of another
person :" Leather Cloth Co. v. American
Leather Cloth Co., 11 H. L. C. 523.
And the same rule, it appears, would
apply to tradesmen not being manufacturers. Vice-Chancellor KinezSnnyGlenny v. Smith, 2 Dr. & Sm. 476 ; s. c.
11 Jurist (N. S.) 964; 13 L. T. R.
(N. S.) 11 ; and 6 New Rep. 363. (See
20 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) 304, on
Trade-marks.)
This decision of the House of Lords is
not irreconcilable with Howard v. Park,
supra. In the latter case the Supreme
Court of New York drew an inference
from the defendants' conduct, in not
pursuing the information which they
had received, that they did not desire

